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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
DEBORAH EAVES on behalf of herself * 





EARTHLlNK, INC. * 
* 
Defendant. * 
Civil Action No. 2005-CV-97274 
(Business Division 1-AB) 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
Counsel appeared before the Court on February 9,2009, to present oral 
argument on Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After reviewing the 
motions and briefs submitted on this matter, the arguments presented by counsel, and 
the pleadings in this case, the Court finds as follows: 
Standard 
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c) requires that 
the Court take all well-pled material allegations by the non-movant as true. A motion for 
judgment on the pleadings shall be granted if the averments in the complaint "disclose 
with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of his claim." Cox v. Turner, 268 Ga. App. 305, 305 
(2004) (citations omitted). In order to decide a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
the Court may look to the pleadings, as well as to any other exhibits, such as 
agreements, attached to the complaint. Gold Creek SL, LLC v. City of Dawsonville, 290 
Ga. App. 807, 809 (2008). 
Facts 
This class action suit involves claims regarding Defendant's practice of charging 
early termination fees ("ETFs") to consumers' on-file credit cards. Three subcategories 
exist within the Plaintiff Class: (1) those who have cancelled their EarthLink service 
and paid an ETF, (2) those who have cancelled their EarthLink service, but refused to 
pay an ETF, and (3) those subject to an ETF charge upon cancellation of services. 
Defendants bring this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with regard to the first 
identified subcategory of Plaintiffs, those who have cancelled their EarthLink services 
and paid an ETF. 
Upon the initiation of services, the individual members of the Plaintiff Class and 
EarthLink entered into a Service Agreement, which was attached as Exhibit A to the 
Complaint. 1 The Service Agreement stated that cancellation of the service prior to the 
initial term of the agreement would result in a $149.95 charge.2 Additionally, pursuant to 
the Service Agreement, customers agreed to keep a current credit card on file with 
EarthLink.3 
1. The Plaintiff Class does not dispute that the Service Agreement entered into 
between the individual members of the Plaintiff Class and EarthLink is substantially 
similar to the form attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. 
2. (4) Cancellation. "If you are dissatisfied with the Service or any related terms, 
conditions, rules, policies, guidelines, or practices, your sole remedy is to discontinue 
using the Service, cancel your account, and pay any cancellation fees that apply .... 
Cancellation of the Service by you before the initial term of the agreement ends will 
result in a $149.95 charge." 
3. (6) Payment "You are responsible for any charges to your account.. .. Charges are 
billed to your credit card or debit card, as applicable, each month for the Service and 
any additional usage or services .... You agree to maintain valid and current credit card 
information on file with EarthLink at all times." 
2 
Voluntary Payment Doctrine 
EarthLink moves for judgment on the pleadings fees pursuant to the voluntary 
payment doctrine on claims by members of the Plaintiff Class who have already paid 
the early termination fee. Pursuant to the voluntary payment doctrine, "[p]ayments of . 
claims through ignorance of the law or where all the facts are known and there is no 
misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception, or fraudulent practice used by the 
other party are deemed voluntary and cannot be recovered." O.C.G.A. § 13-1-13. The 
Plaintiff Class, as the party seeking to recover payment, bears the burden of 
establishing that the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply. Telescripps Cable Co. 
v. Welsh, 247 Ga. App. 282 (2001). 
Georgia has developed a robust body of case law pertaining to the voluntary 
payment doctrine. For example, in Telescripps, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that 
voluntary payment of a cable provider's late fee by subscribers who did not know that 
the late fee was an unenforceable penalty were made "under ignorance of the law" and 
thus not recoverable under the voluntary payment doctrine. Telescripps, 247 Ga. App. 
at 285. Additionally, in Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Radiotherapy of Ga., 252 Ga. App. 
543 (2001), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the voluntary payment doctrine 
barred the recovery of excessive Medicare payments by the plaintiff insurance company 
because the Medicare rules were matters of public record and there was no evidence of 
fraud or misplaced confidence. While the situations of application may vary, the law is 
clear that "[w]hen money is paid with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances 
upon which it is demanded, or with the means of such knowledge, it cannot be 
recovered back ... " Telescripps, 247 Ga. App. at 285. 
3 
The Plaintiff Class opposes the application of the voluntary payment doctrine in 
this case on the grounds that the manner in which the ETF was collected was deceptive 
and involuntary. The Plaintiff Class asserts that the ETF charges were not authorized 
to be automatically billed to the on-file credit cards because such fees do not qualify as 
"charges" or "additional services or usage" under the terms of the Service Agreement. 
The Court reads paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Services Agreement as unambiguously 
authorizing the ETF charge of $149.95 to be made to the on-file credit card. Thus, the 
Court finds that the ETF charges were made with prior knowledge by and authorization 
of the individual members of the Plaintiff Class. 
Alternatively, the Plaintiff Class distinguishes this case from Telescripps and its 
predecessors based upon the automatic manner in which the ETFs were charged to 
customers arguing that it is deceptive and involuntary. Unlike previous forms of billing 
that required a bill to be sent to a customer who must then affirmatively act to pay the 
bill (i.e., provide cash, write a check, provide a credit card number, etc.), the ETF was 
charged directly to the credit card on file. Therefore, there was no time for notice to or 
action by the customer during the time between when the ETF was billed by EarthLink 
and subsequently "paid" by the customers.4 
The Plaintiff Class argues that if the voluntary payment doctrine is applied to bar 
recovery of automatic charges to on-file credit cards as presented in this case, then any 
fee concocted by EarthLink and charged to customers' credit cards would be 
4. Those members of the Plaintiff Class falling in the second subcategory, those who 
cancelled their service and refused to pay the ETF, had to take action after the charge 
appeared on their credit card bill (Le., contacting the company, charging back the fee 
through their credit card, etc.). 
4 
unrecoverable. Such a case is not before the Court. Here, the Service Agreement 
specifically provided for the payment of an ETF as well as the requirement that a credit 
card be kept on file. While the exact terms of the service contract in this case are 
distinguishable from Telescripps, the principle enunciated in that case-that the 
voluntary payment doctrine applies to payments made with knowledge of the facts-is 
applicable to and binding on this case. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the claims of the members of the Class who paid 
an early termination fee are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine and hereby 
GRANTS Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of EarthLink on the claimsof those Class 
members. 
50 ORDERED this ! 't> day of ---=-Ce.b-=------_. ___ , 2009. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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